miércoles, 30 de abril de 2008

Tecnicas de negociación: negocie con un loco

De MateriaBiz, espero que les sea util.

¿Cómo negociar con un loco?
"¿Por qué este empleado rechaza el alto salario que le ofrezco sin una alternativa mejor?", se pregunta el jefe, "¿Se ha vuelto loco?". Cuando negociamos, muchas veces creemos que la otra parte actúa irracionalmente. ¿O somos nosotros los irracionales?

"Mire, usted es un trabajador fundamental en esta empresa", dijo el jefe, "He decidido premiarlo con un aumento del 300 por ciento. Desde el mes que viene, usted ganará el doble que sus colegas". "No, gracias", contestó el empleado, "mañana tendrá mi renuncia sobre su escritorio".

El jefe se quedó helado. En efecto, bien sabía que aquel empleado nunca conseguiría una mejor alternativa. La propuesta superaba ampliamente los sueldos de mercado para aquel puesto. ¿Acaso se había vuelto loco?

A la hora de negociar, es frecuente enfrentar personas que parecen cometer groseros errores estratégicos o que toman decisiones que parecen contrarias a sus propios intereses. Así, solemos abandonar la mesa convencidos de haber estado conversando con un ser irracional.

Sin embargo, advierte un artículo de Harvard, mejor tener cuidado antes de juzgar la cordura de un negociador. El apresuramiento puede ser una vía hacia malos acuerdos. Por lo tanto, antes de convencerse de estar tratando con un lunático, mejor hágase una serie de preguntas:

1) ¿Es irracional o está mal informado?

Un vendedor recientemente despedido reclamaba a una empresa 130.000 dólares en comisiones no liquidadas. Los ejecutivos, por su parte, alegaban no sólo que no le debían un centavo sino que, por un error contable, hasta le habían pagado 25.000 dólares de más.

Pero los ejecutivos no querían seguir dilatando la situación. Un buen día, enviaron al vendedor el siguiente mensaje: "Aquí tiene un resumen contable de sus ventas desde que ingresó a la empresa y las comisiones liquidadas. Aquí figura claramente que le hemos pagado 25.000 dólares de más. Si nos demanda, esta prueba será suficiente para que usted pierda el juicio. Pero si retira la demanda, nosotros le perdonaremos los 25.000 dólares que nos debe".

El vendedor se negó. Los ejecutivos se preguntaron si estaban lidiando con un auténtico demente. ¿Por qué insistir con un juicio que perdería? ¿Por qué no aceptaba los 25.000 dólares?

Ahora bien, advierten los investigadores de Harvard, desde otra perspectiva, el comportamiento del vendedor era perfectamente razonable. En realidad, él desconfiaba de los datos que le presentaba la empresa.

Una vez descubierto el cortocircuito en la información, el conflicto se resolvió con asombrosa sencillez. La firma contrató un auditor externo para que certificara la veracidad de la información. Así, una vez convencido de que perdería el juicio, el vendedor retiró la demanda.

Moraleja: antes de tildar de "irracional" a una persona, pregúntese lo que realmente sabe e intente generar confianza. En muchos casos, las personas se niegan a aceptar acuerdos que parecen beneficiarlas porque carecen de información.

2) ¿Es irracional o tiene restricciones ocultas?

En muchos casos, desconocer las restricciones que enfrenta una persona es suficiente para tildarla de "irracional".

Imagine que usted es un empleado estrella que ha recibido una suculenta oferta de un competidor. Usted le plantea la situación a su jefe. Pero, asombrosamente, éste no hace nada para retenerlo. ¿Se ha vuelto loco? Usted sabe perfectamente que reemplazarlo le costará a la empresa muchísimo más que lo que usted está pidiendo para quedarse. ¿Por qué no le dan el aumento?

De hecho, si dependiera exclusivamente de su jefe, él le pagaría el triple que la competencia. Sin embargo, la compañía tiene una estricta política de aumentos destinada a mantener la equidad en el esquema de compensaciones.

Moraleja: un comportamiento aparentemente irracional puede ser una manifestación de ciertas restricciones ocultas. Por lo tanto, antes de creer que usted está negociando con un loco, intente averiguar cuáles son estas restricciones y ayúdelo a superarlas.

3) ¿Es irracional o tiene intereses ocultos?

Regresemos al ejemplo inicial de este artículo. ¿Por qué un empleado querría rechazar un aumento del 300 por ciento sin una alternativa mejor? ¿Se trata de un verdadero lunático?

En realidad, la decisión no parece tan irracional si consideramos que el trabajador estaba sometido a enormes dosis de estrés. En última instancia, prefería sacrificar ingresos a cambio de una vida más relajada en un puesto de menor responsabilidad.

En definitiva, advierten los investigadores de Harvard, uno de los grandes pecados del negociador consiste en juzgar la conducta del otro sin suficiente información. Cuando usted no conoce los datos que maneja la otra parte, sus restricciones o verdaderos intereses, posiblemente encontrará locura en actos signados por la más fría racionalidad.

De la redacción de MATERIABIZ

lunes, 28 de abril de 2008

Historias de Emprendedores & Emprendimientos

Diario La Nacion - Economía y Negocios

Un servicio para manejar toda la casa a través de Internet

¿Me olvidé la ventana abierta? ¿Cerré bien la puerta? ¿Apagué las luces? Esas preguntas pueden convertirse en algo del pasado con la propuesta de Broken Mind, una empresa que vende la casa "inteligente", con la cual es posible apagar una luz con un celular o ver si alguien entró en la casa desde cualquier computadora con Internet.

Detrás del proyecto están Juan Pablo Degiovanni, Diego Cassino y Lucas Rolandi. Los dos primeros están acostumbrados a abrir nuevos mercados: antes de que los mensajes de texto se masificaran, crearon M-Joy una empresa de servicios de telefonía para tecnología móvil, que luego vendieron a muy buen precio y gerenciaron por dos años.

"Empezamos otra vez con algo nuevo. Siempre miramos lo que se afirma en los mercados desarrollados porque sabemos que vendrá acá, tarde o temprano. Lucas comenzó a trabajar en el proyecto a principios de 2007 y nosotros nos metimos de lleno a fin de año, cuando terminó nuestro contrato", contó Cassino.

Con una inversión inicial de 70.000 dólares, el trío importó los equipos necesarios y acondicionó un show room en Núñez, que permite ver concretamente en qué consiste la casa inteligente. Al llegar a la puerta, el visitante ya tiene la primera pista: un dispositivo de huella digital, que reconoce al dueño de la propiedad.

"El producto es para consumidores de alto poder adquisitivo. Hoy les vendemos a arquitectos y desarrolladores y a residenciales. Ya funcionan sistemas Broken Mind en La Dolfina, Highland, Barrio Norte y la torre El Faro de Puerto Madero", destacó Degiovanni. Con esos proyectos y otros por venir, entre los que se destaca uno en Uruguay, la compañía facturará 350.000 dólares este año.

Los emprendedores afirman que el potencial del mercado es grande porque "los desarrolladores están buscando sumar valor a sus proyectos con propuestas innovadoras". Además, aparecen los servicios de contenidos que se pueden proveer a través de la interconexión del hogar. "Un ejemplo puede ser un contrato con un delivery de helados o sushi para que el cliente pueda apretar un botón y hacer su pedido. Si todo está conectado, los límites son pocos", concluyó Cassino.

viernes, 25 de abril de 2008

¿debe un gerente general ocuparse del "día a día"?

De MateriaBiz, espero que les sea útil.

Más allá de los cócteles y la estrategia: ¿debe un gerente general ocuparse del "día a día"?
Suele estar mal visto que el gerente general dedique tiempo a tareas operativas. Sin embargo, quizá esa sea la forma de obtener los mejores resultados...

Por Mariano Vinocur y María Eugenia Martínez (BDO Becher)

Suele decirse que un gerente general debe enfocarse en la estrategia y la planificación de acciones de largo plazo para el crecimiento de la organización.

Así, con sus agendas saturadas de cócteles, reuniones con accionistas y viajes internacionales, los número uno apenas dedican unas pocas horas mensuales a tareas del "día a día".

Sin embargo, nuestra experiencia en coaching para gerentes generales nos ha enseñado que los mejores resultados suelen encontrarse entre aquellos que mantienen una agenda equilibrada con objetivos de corto, mediano y largo plazo, una agenda que divide el tiempo entre estrategia y tareas operativas.

Así, la agenda del número uno debería dividirse en cuatro perspectivas fundamentales:

1) Perspectiva del negocio

El gerente general debe enfocarse en el crecimiento de la organización y los resultados de largo plazo a través de una definición de los negocios actuales, la imaginación de futuros escenarios y el impulso de nuevos negocios.

2)
Perspectiva estratégica

El CEO debe definir la misión, visión y valores de la empresa y formular un plan para lograr que las capacidades organizacionales sean aptas para el cumplimiento de los objetivos.

3) Perspectiva Política

Toda empresa opera en un entorno económico y social. A la hora de tomar decisiones, el número uno necesita comprender el contexto en relación con la visión y misión de la empresa.

4)
Perspectiva táctica operativa

En esta perspectiva, el gerente general debe asegurarse de que sus colaboradores comprendan las acciones requeridas para el logro de objetivos, gestionar las personas en el marco de los valores organizacionales, propiciar el desarrollo de ejecutivos y liderar desde el ejemplo.

Ahora bien, este marco conceptual es útil para desmitificar el viejo prejuicio de que el número uno sólo debe ocuparse de la estrategia.

Lo cierto es que la formulación estratégica sólo debería insumir un 25 por ciento del tiempo.

Una agenda óptima se focaliza en la renovación permanente de la organización a partir de acciones coordinadas y articuladas que persiguen réplicas efectivas desde los diferentes actores implicados (los directores y gerentes).

En definitiva, la clave radica en un delicado equilibrio entre alta estrategia y las cuestiones del día a día.

miércoles, 23 de abril de 2008

¿hay que adaptar el estilo de liderazgo?

De materiabiz, espero que les sea útil.

"Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia", una introducción al liderazgo situacional
Conducir un rebaño de blancas ovejitas no es lo mismo que dirigir una manada de hambrientos leones. Si no adapta su estilo de liderazgo a las circunstancias, posiblemente se lo comerán crudo...

Por Ari Sabbagh

Algunos expertos sostienen que los mismos rasgos y comportamientos de un líder son universales y funcionales en cualquier situación.

Sin embargo, existe una corriente teórica que sostiene que el éxito de un líder radica en su capacidad de adecuar sus acciones a las particularidades de cada caso.

En esta corriente, podemos incluir al Modelo de Contingencia de Fiedler, el Modelo de Liderazgo Situacional de Hersey-Blanchard y el Modelo de Toma de Decisiones de Vroom-Jago.

Estos modelos situacionales comparten tres factores básicos. Primero, describen un repertorio de acciones al alcance del líder. Segundo, detallan los elementos críticos para evaluar la situación. Finalmente, sugieren un tipo de acción para cada caso.

1) Repertorio de acciones para el líder

Un líder puede variar su comportamiento en base a su orientación y a su estilo.

La orientación puede enfocarse a la tarea o a la relación (o a una combinación de ambas).

Un líder toma decisiones a través de uno de los siguientes estilos: autónomo (el líder toma la decisión solo), consultivo (el líder consulta al grupo y toma la decisión solo), participativo (la toma de decisiones se produce por consenso) o delega (el desafío es delegado a un individuo o subgrupo para que este tome la decisión).

2) Criterios para evaluar la situación

Algunas preguntas clave que un líder debe contemplar a la hora de evaluar la situación incluyen:

¿Cuál es el nivel de urgencia para actuar? ¿Cuán importante es la calidad técnica de la decisión a tomar? ¿Qué tan importante es el compromiso del subordinado con la decisión?

¿Cuenta el subordinado con la información suficiente para tomar una buena decisión? ¿El desafío es claro y bien estructurado? ¿Tengo el poder formal o informal necesario para implementar la decisión?

3) ¿Cómo decidir?

A grandes rasgos, la centralización de la decisión y la orientación a la tarea son importantes cuando:

a) El asunto requiere una decisión urgente

b) Los subordinados comparten la visión de la situación y están comprometidos a los objetivos y valores de la empresa y de la tarea

c) El líder cuenta con suficiente información para tomar la decisión así como el poder formal e informal para implementarla.

En el caso que no se den las características enumeradas arriba, suele ser aconsejable la participación de los subordinados en la toma de decisiones y una orientación a la relación, tanto para aumentar el nivel de compromiso como la calidad técnica de la decisión.

lunes, 21 de abril de 2008

Cuatro condiciones para que un programa de capacitación sea bueno

Del blog Mejores Proyectos, espero que les sea util.

¿Cómo resultó el último programa de capacitación organizado en tu empresa? ¿Fue útil? ¿O aprendiste cosas que te gustaron en el momento del curso, pero que luego no las aplicaste? O lo que es peor: alguien en tu organización dice “Eso era un curso, era teórico, ahora estamos en un proyecto real, hagámoslo diferente”. Para que un programa de capacitación sea bueno y útil, se deben cumplir estas cuatro condiciones en forma encadenada:

1. Las necesidades de la organización definen lo que se enseña. El curso in company no es la universidad, que tiene programas genéricos. La organización define el contenido de la capacitación en base a los objetivos de las áreas. Toda la metodología del PMI es muy buena, pero es muy extensa. ¿Qué objetivos tiene el área con respecto a una metodología de administración de proyectos? ¿Dónde te aprieta el zapato? ¿Cuáles son tus problemas típicos en proyectos? Todo esto debe definir el contenido de la capacitación.

2. Lo que se enseña puede ser aprendido. Lo que se enseña debe responder al nivel intelectual, la experiencia y conocimientos previos de la audiencia. Quizás el tema sea excelente y el contenido también, pero los alumnos no lo puedan aprender. Se debe pensar en que los alumnos puedan entender y ejemplificar lo que se enseña.

3. Lo que se aprende puede ser trasladado al trabajo. ¿Qué hago con esto el lunes a la mañana? Este es el tagline(*) de nuestro blog Mejores Proyectos. A veces es muy atractiva una metodología, pero si no la puedo aplicar ¿para qué la estudio? Si el curso tiene ese estilo, es mejor leer un libro de project management. El verdadero desafío de un programa de formación debe ser entregar conceptos al alumno que sean aplicables en su trabajo desde el lunes a la mañana.

4. Lo que es trasladado al trabajo es sostenible en el tiempo. ¿Para qué cambiar mi forma de trabajar el lunes a la mañana si dentro de un mes voy a estar trabajando con los viejos defectos otra vez? El verdadero desafío de un programa de formación debe ser entregar conceptos al alumno que luego se internalicen en su trabajo, que sean parte de sus tareas diarias.

viernes, 18 de abril de 2008

Montar un negocio sin experiencia

Del de Blog de François Derbaix, espero que les sea útil.

En diciembre 1999 trabajaba en Bruselas en The Boston Consulting Group (consultoría en management estratégico) y Marta y yo habíamos decidido movernos a Madrid y montar un portal de turismo rural.

Recuerdo una conversación de aquella época con mi “manager” en BCG, Yvan Jansen, que me decía que tantos cambios a la vez quizá era una decisión un tanto arriesgada: no tenía experiencia ni en turismo, ni en turismo rural (sólo había estado una vez en una casa rural, en Bélgica), ni en Internet, ni en España… Yvan tenía razón, eran muchos cambios, y tenía muy poco para “triunfar” en algo tan desconocido. Así que… igual seguimos adelante y con 25 años cada uno lanzamos TopRural.

Era bueno saber que no sabíamos nada de lo que había que saber. Pero nada de lo que nos faltaba era insuperable. Llegamos a Madrid en marzo 2000 y empezamos con el proyecto.
Designing Web Usability, Jakob Nielsen ¿Nos faltaba experiencia en diseño Web? Compramos el libro Designing Web Usability” de Jacob Nielsen y lo seguimos lo mejor que pudimos para empezar a dibujar el portal (suena a cachondeo pero realmente fue así).

¿Nos faltaba experiencia en Internet? Nos asociamos con Juan Andrés Alvarez Valenzuela, un programador muy bueno con un par de años de desarrollo Web.

¿Nos faltaba experiencia en turismo rural? Compramos todas las guías de turismo rural del momento y contactamos con los autores de la mejor guía (el Anuario de Turismo Rural). Les gustó el proyecto, aportaron muchas ideas y acabamos asociándonos.

¿Nos faltaba experiencia en montar una empresa? Igual dimos el paso más importante: yo me dedicaría a tiempo completo al proyecto e invertiríamos nuestros ahorros (y algo de nuestros amigos y familiares, 100.000 € en total).

Creía firmemente que no había ningún negocio donde no podíamos hacernos un hueco, a condición de meter toda la carne en el asador, de hacer bien las cosas y por supuesto de tener un poco (bastante) de suerte. También lo hicimos con muchas ganas e ilusión y mucho apoyo de nuestros amigos. Con la retrospectiva estoy seguro que no teníamos el éxito asegurado pero que lo más importante era probarlo.

En definitiva no arriesgamos nada que no podíamos perder: unos ahorros de gente que sabían que podían perderlo (no eran deudas que hay que devolver en caso de fallar), y unos años de trabajo que en cualquier caso quedan como una buena experiencia (aunque no salga adelante el negocio). Sin duda repetiría la experiencia, y la recomiendo a quien tenga la tentación de probar su suerte. En definitiva creo que lo importante es probar, y asociarse con quien puede completar tus carencias.

miércoles, 16 de abril de 2008

Historias de Emprendedores & Emprendimientos

Diario La Nacion - Economía y Negocios

Con la miel como materia prima, crean delikatessen dulces y saladas

En 2003, entusiasmado por un amigo, Frusto dejó su trabajo en Trenes de Buenos Aires (TBA), compró 400 colmenas y empezó con la producción de miel. "Cuando obtuve la primera cosecha, el precio de la miel se derrumbó porque habían encontrado nitrofuranos en la miel que la Argentina envió a Europa", recuerda. "Tenía 20 tambores de miel y no la quería tirar ni regalar; quería darle valor agregado."

Así que se encerró en la cocina del campo familiar para hacer salsas y mermeladas con la miel como principal ingrediente. "Durante ese tiempo vivimos de los ahorros y del trabajo de mi mujer", explica. Lo primero que logró, basándose en recetas familiares, fue una salsa de mostaza y miel. Luego el chutney de frutas (una conserva agridulce para acompañar carnes).

Siempre pensando en posicionarse entre los productos gourmet salió a vender por las vinotecas y almacenes en la provincia de Buenos Aires, en las localidades cercanas al campo donde había instalado los apiarios: Suipacha, Bragado, Chivilcoy y 9 de Julio.

Por su parte, Patricia, a la par que trabajaba en el área de marketing de Unilever, había formado una empresa, Kaupen (que significa ´estar en casa en tehuelche), con dos socios para vender miel tipificada al exterior. "Vimos una oportunidad en Europa, donde se consume mucha más miel que acá, y de distintos sabores: miel de limón, de romero". Pero ninguno de los tres socios dejó sus respectivos trabajos para jugarse por el emprendimiento y la empresa dejó de funcionar.

En 2006, Patricia y Guillermo se conocieron y decidieron sumar fuerzas para sacar adelante la empresa Pampagourmet, y su marca, Delicias de Campo. Ganaron el concurso Naves, del centro de entrepreneurship del IAE, donde compiten los mejores planes de negocios. Con ese triunfo en la mano, Patricia se decidió finalmente a dejar su trabajo y asumió la parte comercial de Pampagourmet.

Hoy, con colmenas propias, y abasteciéndose además de otros productores, la línea de productos se divide en salsas para comidas y carnes, salsas para postres, mermeladas y miel. También incursionaron en recetas sin miel, como el chimichurri con malbec, porque descubrieron que en muchos países representaba una barrera para el ingreso.

Con una inversión inicial de $ 150.000, hoy facturan cerca de $ 40.000 por mes y la producción es de 6000 frascos. Este año la producción se sextuplicó gracias al ingreso en Carrefour, Jumbo, Wal-Mart y Libertad. "Lo más complicado del crecimiento fue atar la producción a la cosecha para no quedarnos sin materia prima en medio de la temporada", dice Frusto.


lunes, 14 de abril de 2008

5 motivos por los que no ser emprendedor

Del blog apuntesgestion.com, comprato, y no me arrepiento de ser emprendedor, ustedes?

Ser emprendedor realmente es hermoso…

Eres libre, no dependes más que de ti mismo, no soportas a nadie más que a ti (en todo caso a tu mujer), tu eres el líder…suena impresionante!!

Pues bienvenidos al mundo real ya que, lo que suena tambien, puede convertirse en días de trabajo interminables, stress, problemas hasta debajo de las piedras, falta de dinero, críticas, pérdida de autoestima y esto si que es real…

Si estás pensando en convertirte en empresario voy a contarte 5 cosas para que te lo plantees mejor. Luego no me digas que no te avisé.

1. Horarios semanales 60 hrs: Si lo tuyo es hacer las 8 horas y lo demás es para otros…nunca te plantees emprender. Como emprendedor tendrás tantos frentes abiertos que no tendrás un número fijo de horas de trabajo y con ello te darás cuenta que los días pasan y siempre la misma canción…dormir, comer, trabajar, dormir, comer, trabajar…tu vida serás tu y el trabajo…no, el trabajo y tu…

2. Tiempo libre: Como emprendedor llegará un momento en el que tengas que recurrir al diccionario para saber que era esto…Yo, personalmente, echo en falta tiempo libre para poder leer con tranquilidad y por ocio, no por trabajo. Pero lo peor de todo es que tus amigos te llamarán para preguntarte si has emigrado o te has convertido en uno de esos policías de la secreta.

3. Burro de Carga: Trabajarás mucho tiempo pero también tendrás que trabajar mucho. Fuego que apagas, fuego que aparece y así en continua temporada de incendios…tendrás tantas piedras en los zapatos que aprenderás a caminar con ellas…

4. Incertidumbre: Convertirse en emprendedor es admitir que te gustan las películas de terror, siempre tendrás algún susto, siempre habrá algo imprevisto, siempre habrá incertidumbre y siempre verás el futuro con una especie de intriga, pasión, miedo…y todo con esa música de fondo que te obliga a husmear cuando todo el mundo está diciéndote que no vayas…

5. Errores: Imagínate que ya lo has hecho, que has pedido ese préstamo al banco, imagínate que el banco te lo ha concedido, imagínate que te has metido a la oportunidad de negocio más clara que nunca has tenido…y aún no puedes entender como tu pareja, tu padre, tus amigos…todos te decían que no lo hicieras…pues bien ahora imagínate que es una ruina y que todos tenían razón…¿Cómo te sentirás la próxima vez que tengas otra oportunidad así?

Si aún a pesar de todo te decides por emprender…me alegro mucho ya que serás de los que valoran su independencia y que harán lo posible por sacar adelante su idea…

viernes, 11 de abril de 2008

Dealing with unpopular employees

del blog The Chief Happiness Officer, espero que les sea util para tratar a sus empleados.

Send them packing

Here’s a recent question from CNN Money:

One of my employees is pretty capable, but she lacks people skills. No one in the office likes dealing with her. Recently she called me at home at 9 P.M. on a Friday, crying and saying she was typing up her résumé because the entire staff was against her.

I listened, and then hinted that it wasn’t the time or place to discuss this. Now office tension is high. Can I tell this woman that, because she said she was updating her résumé, I assume she’s given notice?
(source)

That’s a good question but here’s an even better one: if that employee’s behavior is so bad and her social skills so atrocious, why hasn’t the manager reacted a long time ago? This is one of the most important things we have managers for - to make sure that counter-productive behavior in the workplaces is stopped.

I read an interesting quote the other day (though I’ve forgotten where) that said that any behavior by employees that is not stopped by management becomes de facto legal.

Bad behavior includes gossiping, badmouthing co-workers, constant negativity, unconstructive criticisms, bullying, not helping co-workers and not sharing information. If managers see this and do nothing - it’s now OK.

And it shouldn’t be!

One manager from a company I’ve worked with, took this responsibility seriously. One of his employees, a lady in her 50s who’s been with the company for many years, had become habitually negative.

She’d end most phone calls by slamming down the receiver and blurting “Idiot!” whether she’d been talking to a customer or a co-worker. She would criticize all suggestions and plans she was consulted on. Co-workers respected her knowledge and competence but didn’t dare ask her any questions because of her demeanor.

Finally the manager had a meeting with her. He explained exactly how he viewed her behavior and why it was making him and her co-workers unhappy at work. He then gave her the rest of the day off.

When she called in sick the next day, he was pretty sure he was going to lose that employee. She returned to work the day after and asked for a meeting with him. And this is when she amazed him.

She’d spent some time thinking about this and talking to her husband - and she’d come to agree that her behavior had become much too negative. The scary thing is that she hadn’t done any of this consciously - it had become a habit. One she now wanted to break.

She’s been working on it since and both the manager and her co-worker have noticed a marked shift in her behavior. So, by the way, has her husband.

This is exactly how managers should handle this type of situation. Employees who exhibit this type of bad behavior need attention and help to break out of it. If their behavior improves - excellent. Then it’s time to follow up and make sure the change is lasting. If it doesn’t help, then it’s time to fire that person.

Letting people stay in jobs where they don’t fit in, where they’re not happy and where they’re not pulling their weight is a mistake. Managers may think they’re doing them a favor… they’re not!

Remember, just one unhappy, unproductive employee can pull down the whole department. And what’s worse - this attitude is contagious. It spreads and infects others and if you’re not careful, you’ll end up with a hard-core little clique of dissatisfied, cynical employees who make everyone around them unhappy.

miércoles, 9 de abril de 2008

Cómo fundar un Start-Up

del blog de Paul Graham, un poco largo, pero vale la pena.

Venture funding works like gears. A typical startup goes through several rounds of funding, and at each round you want to take just enough money to reach the speed where you can shift into the next gear.

Few startups get it quite right. Many are underfunded. A few are overfunded, which is like trying to start driving in third gear.

I think it would help founders to understand funding better—not just the mechanics of it, but what investors are thinking. I was surprised recently when I realized that all the worst problems we faced in our startup were due not to competitors, but investors. Dealing with competitors was easy by comparison.

I don't mean to suggest that our investors were nothing but a drag on us. They were helpful in negotiating deals, for example. I mean more that conflicts with investors are particularly nasty. Competitors punch you in the jaw, but investors have you by the balls.

Apparently our situation was not unusual. And if trouble with investors is one of the biggest threats to a startup, managing them is one of the most important skills founders need to learn.

Let's start by talking about the five sources of startup funding. Then we'll trace the life of a hypothetical (very fortunate) startup as it shifts gears through successive rounds.

Friends and Family

A lot of startups get their first funding from friends and family. Excite did, for example: after the founders graduated from college, they borrowed $15,000 from their parents to start a company. With the help of some part-time jobs they made it last 18 months.

If your friends or family happen to be rich, the line blurs between them and angel investors. At Viaweb we got our first $10,000 of seed money from our friend Julian, but he was sufficiently rich that it's hard to say whether he should be classified as a friend or angel. He was also a lawyer, which was great, because it meant we didn't have to pay legal bills out of that initial small sum.

The advantage of raising money from friends and family is that they're easy to find. You already know them. There are three main disadvantages: you mix together your business and personal life; they will probably not be as well connected as angels or venture firms; and they may not be accredited investors, which could complicate your life later.

The SEC defines an "accredited investor" as someone with over a million dollars in liquid assets or an income of over $200,000 a year. The regulatory burden is much lower if a company's shareholders are all accredited investors. Once you take money from the general public you're more restricted in what you can do. [1]

A startup's life will be more complicated, legally, if any of the investors aren't accredited. In an IPO, it might not merely add expense, but change the outcome. A lawyer I asked about it said:
When the company goes public, the SEC will carefully study all prior issuances of stock by the company and demand that it take immediate action to cure any past violations of securities laws. Those remedial actions can delay, stall or even kill the IPO.
Of course the odds of any given startup doing an IPO are small. But not as small as they might seem. A lot of startups that end up going public didn't seem likely to at first. (Who could have guessed that the company Wozniak and Jobs started in their spare time selling plans for microcomputers would yield one of the biggest IPOs of the decade?) Much of the value of a startup consists of that tiny probability multiplied by the huge outcome.

It wasn't because they weren't accredited investors that I didn't ask my parents for seed money, though. When we were starting Viaweb, I didn't know about the concept of an accredited investor, and didn't stop to think about the value of investors' connections. The reason I didn't take money from my parents was that I didn't want them to lose it.

Consulting

Another way to fund a startup is to get a job. The best sort of job is a consulting project in which you can build whatever software you wanted to sell as a startup. Then you can gradually transform yourself from a consulting company into a product company, and have your clients pay your development expenses.

This is a good plan for someone with kids, because it takes most of the risk out of starting a startup. There never has to be a time when you have no revenues. Risk and reward are usually proportionate, however: you should expect a plan that cuts the risk of starting a startup also to cut the average return. In this case, you trade decreased financial risk for increased risk that your company won't succeed as a startup.

But isn't the consulting company itself startup? No, not generally. A company has to be more than small and newly founded to be a startup. There are millions of small businesses in America, but only a few thousand are startups. To be a startup, a company has to be a product business, not a service business. By which I mean not that it has to make something physical, but that it has to have one thing it sells to many people, rather than doing custom work for individual clients. Custom work doesn't scale. To be a startup you need to be the band that sells a million copies of a song, not the band that makes money by playing at individual weddings and bar mitzvahs.

The trouble with consulting is that clients have an awkward habit of calling you on the phone. Most startups operate close to the margin of failure, and the distraction of having to deal with clients could be enough to put you over the edge. Especially if you have competitors who get to work full time on just being a startup.

So you have to be very disciplined if you take the consulting route. You have to work actively to prevent your company growing into a "weed tree," dependent on this source of easy but low-margin money. [2]

Indeed, the biggest danger of consulting may be that it gives you an excuse for failure. In a startup, as in grad school, a lot of what ends up driving you are the expectations of your family and friends. Once you start a startup and tell everyone that's what you're doing, you're now on a path labelled "get rich or bust." You now have to get rich, or you've failed.

Fear of failure is an extraordinarily powerful force. Usually it prevents people from starting things, but once you publish some definite ambition, it switches directions and starts working in your favor. I think it's a pretty clever piece of jiujitsu to set this irresistible force against the slightly less immovable object of becoming rich. You won't have it driving you if your stated ambition is merely to start a consulting company that you will one day morph into a startup.

An advantage of consulting, as a way to develop a product, is that you know you're making something at least one customer wants. But if you have what it takes to start a startup you should have sufficient vision not to need this crutch.

Angel Investors

Angels are individual rich people. The word was first used for backers of Broadway plays, but now applies to individual investors generally. Angels who've made money in technology are preferable, for two reasons: they understand your situation, and they're a source of contacts and advice.

The contacts and advice can be more important than the money. When del.icio.us took money from investors, they took money from, among others, Tim O'Reilly. The amount he put in was small compared to the VCs who led the round, but Tim is a smart and influential guy and it's good to have him on your side.

You can do whatever you want with money from consulting or friends and family. With angels we're now talking about venture funding proper, so it's time to introduce the concept of exit strategy. Younger would-be founders are often surprised that investors expect them either to sell the company or go public. The reason is that investors need to get their capital back. They'll only consider companies that have an exit strategy—meaning companies that could get bought or go public.

This is not as selfish as it sounds. There are few large, private technology companies. Those that don't fail all seem to get bought or go public. The reason is that employees are investors too—of their time—and they want just as much to be able to cash out. If your competitors offer employees stock options that might make them rich, while you make it clear you plan to stay private, your competitors will get the best people. So the principle of an "exit" is not just something forced on startups by investors, but part of what it means to be a startup.

Another concept we need to introduce now is valuation. When someone buys shares in a company, that implicitly establishes a value for it. If someone pays $20,000 for 10% of a company, the company is in theory worth $200,000. I say "in theory" because in early stage investing, valuations are voodoo. As a company gets more established, its valuation gets closer to an actual market value. But in a newly founded startup, the valuation number is just an artifact of the respective contributions of everyone involved.

Startups often "pay" investors who will help the company in some way by letting them invest at low valuations. If I had a startup and Steve Jobs wanted to invest in it, I'd give him the stock for $10, just to be able to brag that he was an investor. Unfortunately, it's impractical (if not illegal) to adjust the valuation of the company up and down for each investor. Startups' valuations are supposed to rise over time. So if you're going to sell cheap stock to eminent angels, do it early, when it's natural for the company to have a low valuation.

Some angel investors join together in syndicates. Any city where people start startups will have one or more of them. In Boston the biggest is the Common Angels. In the Bay Area it's the Band of Angels. You can find groups near you through the Angel Capital Association. [3] However, most angel investors don't belong to these groups. In fact, the more prominent the angel, the less likely they are to belong to a group.

Some angel groups charge you money to pitch your idea to them. Needless to say, you should never do this.

One of the dangers of taking investment from individual angels, rather than through an angel group or investment firm, is that they have less reputation to protect. A big-name VC firm will not screw you too outrageously, because other founders would avoid them if word got out. With individual angels you don't have this protection, as we found to our dismay in our own startup. In many startups' lives there comes a point when you're at the investors' mercy—when you're out of money and the only place to get more is your existing investors. When we got into such a scrape, our investors took advantage of it in a way that a name-brand VC probably wouldn't have.

Angels have a corresponding advantage, however: they're also not bound by all the rules that VC firms are. And so they can, for example, allow founders to cash out partially in a funding round, by selling some of their stock directly to the investors. I think this will become more common; the average founder is eager to do it, and selling, say, half a million dollars worth of stock will not, as VCs fear, cause most founders to be any less committed to the business.

The same angels who tried to screw us also let us do this, and so on balance I'm grateful rather than angry. (As in families, relations between founders and investors can be complicated.)

The best way to find angel investors is through personal introductions. You could try to cold-call angel groups near you, but angels, like VCs, will pay more attention to deals recommended by someone they respect.

Deal terms with angels vary a lot. There are no generally accepted standards. Sometimes angels' deal terms are as fearsome as VCs'. Other angels, particularly in the earliest stages, will invest based on a two-page agreement.

Angels who only invest occasionally may not themselves know what terms they want. They just want to invest in this startup. What kind of anti-dilution protection do they want? Hell if they know. In these situations, the deal terms tend to be random: the angel asks his lawyer to create a vanilla agreement, and the terms end up being whatever the lawyer considers vanilla. Which in practice usually means, whatever existing agreement he finds lying around his firm. (Few legal documents are created from scratch.)

These heaps o' boilerplate are a problem for small startups, because they tend to grow into the union of all preceding documents. I know of one startup that got from an angel investor what amounted to a five hundred pound handshake: after deciding to invest, the angel presented them with a 70-page agreement. The startup didn't have enough money to pay a lawyer even to read it, let alone negotiate the terms, so the deal fell through.

One solution to this problem would be to have the startup's lawyer produce the agreement, instead of the angel's. Some angels might balk at this, but others would probably welcome it.

Inexperienced angels often get cold feet when the time comes to write that big check. In our startup, one of the two angels in the initial round took months to pay us, and only did after repeated nagging from our lawyer, who was also, fortunately, his lawyer.

It's obvious why investors delay. Investing in startups is risky! When a company is only two months old, every day you wait gives you 1.7% more data about their trajectory. But the investor is already being compensated for that risk in the low price of the stock, so it is unfair to delay.

Fair or not, investors do it if you let them. Even VCs do it. And funding delays are a big distraction for founders, who ought to be working on their company, not worrying about investors. What's a startup to do? With both investors and acquirers, the only leverage you have is competition. If an investor knows you have other investors lined up, he'll be a lot more eager to close-- and not just because he'll worry about losing the deal, but because if other investors are interested, you must be worth investing in. It's the same with acquisitions. No one wants to buy you till someone else wants to buy you, and then everyone wants to buy you.

The key to closing deals is never to stop pursuing alternatives. When an investor says he wants to invest in you, or an acquirer says they want to buy you, don't believe it till you get the check. Your natural tendency when an investor says yes will be to relax and go back to writing code. Alas, you can't; you have to keep looking for more investors, if only to get this one to act. [4]

Seed Funding Firms

Seed firms are like angels in that they invest relatively small amounts at early stages, but like VCs in that they're companies that do it as a business, rather than individuals making occasional investments on the side.

Till now, nearly all seed firms have been so-called "incubators," so Y Combinator gets called one too, though the only thing we have in common is that we invest in the earliest phase.

According to the National Association of Business Incubators, there are about 800 incubators in the US. This is an astounding number, because I know the founders of a lot of startups, and I can't think of one that began in an incubator.

What is an incubator? I'm not sure myself. The defining quality seems to be that you work in their space. That's where the name "incubator" comes from. They seem to vary a great deal in other respects. At one extreme is the sort of pork-barrel project where a town gets money from the state government to renovate a vacant building as a "high-tech incubator," as if it were merely lack of the right sort of office space that had till now prevented the town from becoming a startup hub. At the other extreme are places like Idealab, which generates ideas for new startups internally and hires people to work for them.

The classic Bubble incubators, most of which now seem to be dead, were like VC firms except that they took a much bigger role in the startups they funded. In addition to working in their space, you were supposed to use their office staff, lawyers, accountants, and so on.

Whereas incubators tend (or tended) to exert more control than VCs, Y Combinator exerts less. And we think it's better if startups operate out of their own premises, however crappy, than the offices of their investors. So it's annoying that we keep getting called an "incubator," but perhaps inevitable, because there's only one of us so far and no word yet for what we are. If we have to be called something, the obvious name would be "excubator." (The name is more excusable if one considers it as meaning that we enable people to escape cubicles.)

Because seed firms are companies rather than individual people, reaching them is easier than reaching angels. Just go to their web site and send them an email. The importance of personal introductions varies, but is less than with angels or VCs.

The fact that seed firms are companies also means the investment process is more standardized. (This is generally true with angel groups too.) Seed firms will probably have set deal terms they use for every startup they fund. The fact that the deal terms are standard doesn't mean they're favorable to you, but if other startups have signed the same agreements and things went well for them, it's a sign the terms are reasonable.

Seed firms differ from angels and VCs in that they invest exclusively in the earliest phases—often when the company is still just an idea. Angels and even VC firms occasionally do this, but they also invest at later stages.

The problems are different in the early stages. For example, in the first couple months a startup may completely redefine their idea. So seed investors usually care less about the idea than the people. This is true of all venture funding, but especially so in the seed stage.

Like VCs, one of the advantages of seed firms is the advice they offer. But because seed firms operate in an earlier phase, they need to offer different kinds of advice. For example, a seed firm should be able to give advice about how to approach VCs, which VCs obviously don't need to do; whereas VCs should be able to give advice about how to hire an "executive team," which is not an issue in the seed stage.

In the earliest phases, a lot of the problems are technical, so seed firms should be able to help with technical as well as business problems.

Seed firms and angel investors generally want to invest in the initial phases of a startup, then hand them off to VC firms for the next round. Occasionally startups go from seed funding direct to acquisition, however, and I expect this to become increasingly common.

Google has been aggressively pursuing this route, and now Yahoo is too. Both now compete directly with VCs. And this is a smart move. Why wait for further funding rounds to jack up a startup's price? When a startup reaches the point where VCs have enough information to invest in it, the acquirer should have enough information to buy it. More information, in fact; with their technical depth, the acquirers should be better at picking winners than VCs.

Venture Capital Funds

VC firms are like seed firms in that they're actual companies, but they invest other people's money, and much larger amounts of it. VC investments average several million dollars. So they tend to come later in the life of a startup, are harder to get, and come with tougher terms.

The word "venture capitalist" is sometimes used loosely for any venture investor, but there is a sharp difference between VCs and other investors: VC firms are organized as funds, much like hedge funds or mutual funds. The fund managers, who are called "general partners," get about 2% of the fund annually as a management fee, plus about 20% of the fund's gains.

There is a very sharp dropoff in performance among VC firms, because in the VC business both success and failure are self-perpetuating. When an investment scores spectacularly, as Google did for Kleiner and Sequoia, it generates a lot of good publicity for the VCs. And many founders prefer to take money from successful VC firms, because of the legitimacy it confers. Hence a vicious (for the losers) cycle: VC firms that have been doing badly will only get the deals the bigger fish have rejected, causing them to continue to do badly.

As a result, of the thousand or so VC funds in the US now, only about 50 are likely to make money, and it is very hard for a new fund to break into this group.

In a sense, the lower-tier VC firms are a bargain for founders. They may not be quite as smart or as well connected as the big-name firms, but they are much hungrier for deals. This means you should be able to get better terms from them.

Better how? The most obvious is valuation: they'll take less of your company. But as well as money, there's power. I think founders will increasingly be able to stay on as CEO, and on terms that will make it fairly hard to fire them later.

The most dramatic change, I predict, is that VCs will allow founders to cash out partially by selling some of their stock direct to the VC firm. VCs have traditionally resisted letting founders get anything before the ultimate "liquidity event." But they're also desperate for deals. And since I know from my own experience that the rule against buying stock from founders is a stupid one, this is a natural place for things to give as venture funding becomes more and more a seller's market.

The disadvantage of taking money from less known firms is that people will assume, correctly or not, that you were turned down by the more exalted ones. But, like where you went to college, the name of your VC stops mattering once you have some performance to measure. So the more confident you are, the less you need a brand-name VC. We funded Viaweb entirely with angel money; it never occurred to us that the backing of a well known VC firm would make us seem more impressive. [5]

Another danger of less known firms is that, like angels, they have less reputation to protect. I suspect it's the lower-tier firms that are responsible for most of the tricks that have given VCs such a bad reputation among hackers. They are doubly hosed: the general partners themselves are less able, and yet they have harder problems to solve, because the top VCs skim off all the best deals, leaving the lower-tier firms exactly the startups that are likely to blow up.

For example, lower-tier firms are much more likely to pretend to want to do a deal with you just to lock you up while they decide if they really want to. One experienced CFO said:
The better ones usually will not give a term sheet unless they really want to do a deal. The second or third tier firms have a much higher break rate—it could be as high as 50%.
It's obvious why: the lower-tier firms' biggest fear, when chance throws them a bone, is that one of the big dogs will notice and take it away. The big dogs don't have worry about that.

Falling victim to this trick could really hurt you. As one VC told me:
If you were talking to four VCs, told three of them that you accepted a term sheet, and then have to call them back to tell them you were just kidding, you are absolutely damaged goods.
Here's a partial solution: when a VC offers you a term sheet, ask how many of their last 10 term sheets turned into deals. This will at least force them to lie outright if they want to mislead you.

Not all the people who work at VC firms are partners. Most firms also have a handful of junior employees called something like associates or analysts. If you get a call from a VC firm, go to their web site and check whether the person you talked to is a partner. Odds are it will be a junior person; they scour the web looking for startups their bosses could invest in. The junior people will tend to seem very positive about your company. They're not pretending; they want to believe you're a hot prospect, because it would be a huge coup for them if their firm invested in a company they discovered. Don't be misled by this optimism. It's the partners who decide, and they view things with a colder eye.

Because VCs invest large amounts, the money comes with more restrictions. Most only come into effect if the company gets into trouble. For example, VCs generally write it into the deal that in any sale, they get their investment back first. So if the company gets sold at a low price, the founders could get nothing. Some VCs now require that in any sale they get 4x their investment back before the common stock holders (that is, you) get anything, but this is an abuse that should be resisted.

Another difference with large investments is that the founders are usually required to accept "vesting"—to surrender their stock and earn it back over the next 4-5 years. VCs don't want to invest millions in a company the founders could just walk away from. Financially, vesting has little effect, but in some situations it could mean founders will have less power. If VCs got de facto control of the company and fired one of the founders, he'd lose any unvested stock unless there was specific protection against this. So vesting would in that situation force founders to toe the line.

The most noticeable change when a startup takes serious funding is that the founders will no longer have complete control. Ten years ago VCs used to insist that founders step down as CEO and hand the job over to a business guy they supplied. This is less the rule now, partly because the disasters of the Bubble showed that generic business guys don't make such great CEOs.

But while founders will increasingly be able to stay on as CEO, they'll have to cede some power, because the board of directors will become more powerful. In the seed stage, the board is generally a formality; if you want to talk to the other board members, you just yell into the next room. This stops with VC-scale money. In a typical VC funding deal, the board of directors might be composed of two VCs, two founders, and one outside person acceptable to both. The board will have ultimate power, which means the founders now have to convince instead of commanding.

This is not as bad as it sounds, however. Bill Gates is in the same position; he doesn't have majority control of Microsoft; in principle he also has to convince instead of commanding. And yet he seems pretty commanding, doesn't he? As long as things are going smoothly, boards don't interfere much. The danger comes when there's a bump in the road, as happened to Steve Jobs at Apple.

Like angels, VCs prefer to invest in deals that come to them through people they know. So while nearly all VC funds have some address you can send your business plan to, VCs privately admit the chance of getting funding by this route is near zero. One recently told me that he did not know a single startup that got funded this way.

I suspect VCs accept business plans "over the transom" more as a way to keep tabs on industry trends than as a source of deals. In fact, I would strongly advise against mailing your business plan randomly to VCs, because they treat this as evidence of laziness. Do the extra work of getting personal introductions. As one VC put it:
I'm not hard to find. I know a lot of people. If you can't find some way to reach me, how are you going to create a successful company?
One of the most difficult problems for startup founders is deciding when to approach VCs. You really only get one chance, because they rely heavily on first impressions. And you can't approach some and save others for later, because (a) they ask who else you've talked to and when and (b) they talk among themselves. If you're talking to one VC and he finds out that you were rejected by another several months ago, you'll definitely seem shopworn.

So when do you approach VCs? When you can convince them. If the founders have impressive resumes and the idea isn't hard to understand, you could approach VCs quite early. Whereas if the founders are unknown and the idea is very novel, you might have to launch the thing and show that users loved it before VCs would be convinced.

If several VCs are interested in you, they will sometimes be willing to split the deal between them. They're more likely to do this if they're close in the VC pecking order. Such deals may be a net win for founders, because you get multiple VCs interested in your success, and you can ask each for advice about the other. One founder I know wrote:
Two-firm deals are great. It costs you a little more equity, but being able to play the two firms off each other (as well as ask one if the other is being out of line) is invaluable.
When you do negotiate with VCs, remember that they've done this a lot more than you have. They've invested in dozens of startups, whereas this is probably the first you've founded. But don't let them or the situation intimidate you. The average founder is smarter than the average VC. So just do what you'd do in any complex, unfamiliar situation: proceed deliberately, and question anything that seems odd.

It is, unfortunately, common for VCs to put terms in an agreement whose consequences surprise founders later, and also common for VCs to defend things they do by saying that they're standard in the industry. Standard, schmandard; the whole industry is only a few decades old, and rapidly evolving. The concept of "standard" is a useful one when you're operating on a small scale (Y Combinator uses identical terms for every deal because for tiny seed-stage investments it's not worth the overhead of negotiating individual deals), but it doesn't apply at the VC level. On that scale, every negotiation is unique.

Most successful startups get money from more than one of the preceding five sources. [6] And, confusingly, the names of funding sources also tend to be used as the names of different rounds. The best way to explain how it all works is to follow the case of a hypothetical startup.

Stage 1: Seed Round

Our startup begins when a group of three friends have an idea-- either an idea for something they might build, or simply the idea "let's start a company." Presumably they already have some source of food and shelter. But if you have food and shelter, you probably also have something you're supposed to be working on: either classwork, or a job. So if you want to work full-time on a startup, your money situation will probably change too.

A lot of startup founders say they started the company without any idea of what they planned to do. This is actually less common than it seems: many have to claim they thought of the idea after quitting because otherwise their former employer would own it.

The three friends decide to take the leap. Since most startups are in competitive businesses, you not only want to work full-time on them, but more than full-time. So some or all of the friends quit their jobs or leave school. (Some of the founders in a startup can stay in grad school, but at least one has to make the company his full-time job.)

They're going to run the company out of one of their apartments at first, and since they don't have any users they don't have to pay much for infrastructure. Their main expenses are setting up the company, which costs a couple thousand dollars in legal work and registration fees, and the living expenses of the founders.

The phrase "seed investment" covers a broad range. To some VC firms it means $500,000, but to most startups it means several months' living expenses. We'll suppose our group of friends start with $15,000 from their friend's rich uncle, who they give 5% of the company in return. There's only common stock at this stage. They leave 20% as an options pool for later employees (but they set things up so that they can issue this stock to themselves if they get bought early and most is still unissued), and the three founders each get 25%.

By living really cheaply they think they can make the remaining money last five months. When you have five months' runway left, how soon do you need to start looking for your next round? Answer: immediately. It takes time to find investors, and time (always more than you expect) for the deal to close even after they say yes. So if our group of founders know what they're doing they'll start sniffing around for angel investors right away. But of course their main job is to build version 1 of their software.

The friends might have liked to have more money in this first phase, but being slightly underfunded teaches them an important lesson. For a startup, cheapness is power. The lower your costs, the more options you have—not just at this stage, but at every point till you're profitable. When you have a high "burn rate," you're always under time pressure, which means (a) you don't have time for your ideas to evolve, and (b) you're often forced to take deals you don't like.

Every startup's rule should be: spend little, and work fast.

After ten weeks' work the three friends have built a prototype that gives one a taste of what their product will do. It's not what they originally set out to do—in the process of writing it, they had some new ideas. And it only does a fraction of what the finished product will do, but that fraction includes stuff that no one else has done before.

They've also written at least a skeleton business plan, addressing the five fundamental questions: what they're going to do, why users need it, how large the market is, how they'll make money, and who the competitors are and why this company is going to beat them. (That last has to be more specific than "they suck" or "we'll work really hard.")

If you have to choose between spending time on the demo or the business plan, spend most on the demo. Software is not only more convincing, but a better way to explore ideas.

Stage 2: Angel Round

While writing the prototype, the group has been traversing their network of friends in search of angel investors. They find some just as the prototype is demoable. When they demo it, one of the angels is willing to invest. Now the group is looking for more money: they want enough to last for a year, and maybe to hire a couple friends. So they're going to raise $200,000.

The angel agrees to invest at a pre-money valuation of $1 million. The company issues $200,000 worth of new shares to the angel; if there were 1000 shares before the deal, this means 200 additional shares. The angel now owns 200/1200 shares, or a sixth of the company, and all the previous shareholders' percentage ownership is diluted by a sixth. After the deal, the capitalization table looks like this: <br>shareholder shares percent<br>-------------------------------<br>angel 200 16.7<br>uncle 50 4.2<br>each founder 250 20.8<br>option pool 200 16.7<br> ---- -----<br>total 1200 100<br> To keep things simple, I had the angel do a straight cash for stock deal. In reality the angel might be more likely to make the investment in the form of a convertible loan. A convertible loan is a loan that can be converted into stock later; it works out the same as a stock purchase in the end, but gives the angel more protection against being squashed by VCs in future rounds.

Who pays the legal bills for this deal? The startup, remember, only has a couple thousand left. In practice this turns out to be a sticky problem that usually gets solved in some improvised way. Maybe the startup can find lawyers who will do it cheaply in the hope of future work if the startup succeeds. Maybe someone has a lawyer friend. Maybe the angel pays for his lawyer to represent both sides. (Make sure if you take the latter route that the lawyer is representing you rather than merely advising you, or his only duty is to the investor.)

An angel investing $200k would probably expect a seat on the board of directors. He might also want preferred stock, meaning a special class of stock that has some additional rights over the common stock everyone else has. Typically these rights include vetoes over major strategic decisions, protection against being diluted in future rounds, and the right to get one's investment back first if the company is sold.

Some investors might expect the founders to accept vesting for a sum this size, and others wouldn't. VCs are more likely to require vesting than angels. At Viaweb we managed to raise $2.5 million from angels without ever accepting vesting, largely because we were so inexperienced that we were appalled at the idea. In practice this turned out to be good, because it made us harder to push around.

Our experience was unusual; vesting is the norm for amounts that size. Y Combinator doesn't require vesting, because (a) we invest such small amounts, and (b) we think it's unnecessary, and that the hope of getting rich is enough motivation to keep founders at work. But maybe if we were investing millions we would think differently.

I should add that vesting is also a way for founders to protect themselves against one another. It solves the problem of what to do if one of the founders quits. So some founders impose it on themselves when they start the company.

The angel deal takes two weeks to close, so we are now three months into the life of the company.

The point after you get the first big chunk of angel money will usually be the happiest phase in a startup's life. It's a lot like being a postdoc: you have no immediate financial worries, and few responsibilities. You get to work on juicy kinds of work, like designing software. You don't have to spend time on bureaucratic stuff, because you haven't hired any bureaucrats yet. Enjoy it while it lasts, and get as much done as you can, because you will never again be so productive.

With an apparently inexhaustible sum of money sitting safely in the bank, the founders happily set to work turning their prototype into something they can release. They hire one of their friends—at first just as a consultant, so they can try him out—and then a month later as employee #1. They pay him the smallest salary he can live on, plus 3% of the company in restricted stock, vesting over four years. (So after this the option pool is down to 13.7%). [7] They also spend a little money on a freelance graphic designer.

How much stock do you give early employees? That varies so much that there's no conventional number. If you get someone really good, really early, it might be wise to give him as much stock as the founders. The one universal rule is that the amount of stock an employee gets decreases polynomially with the age of the company. In other words, you get rich as a power of how early you were. So if some friends want you to come work for their startup, don't wait several months before deciding.

A month later, at the end of month four, our group of founders have something they can launch. Gradually through word of mouth they start to get users. Seeing the system in use by real users—people they don't know—gives them lots of new ideas. Also they find they now worry obsessively about the status of their server. (How relaxing founders' lives must have been when startups wrote VisiCalc.)

By the end of month six, the system is starting to have a solid core of features, and a small but devoted following. People start to write about it, and the founders are starting to feel like experts in their field.

We'll assume that their startup is one that could put millions more to use. Perhaps they need to spend a lot on marketing, or build some kind of expensive infrastructure, or hire highly paid salesmen. So they decide to start talking to VCs. They get introductions to VCs from various sources: their angel investor connects them with a couple; they meet a few at conferences; a couple VCs call them after reading about them.

Step 3: Series A Round

Armed with their now somewhat fleshed-out business plan and able to demo a real, working system, the founders visit the VCs they have introductions to. They find the VCs intimidating and inscrutable. They all ask the same question: who else have you pitched to? (VCs are like high school girls: they're acutely aware of their position in the VC pecking order, and their interest in a company is a function of the interest other VCs show in it.)

One of the VC firms says they want to invest and offers the founders a term sheet. A term sheet is a summary of what the deal terms will be when and if they do a deal; lawyers will fill in the details later. By accepting the term sheet, the startup agrees to turn away other VCs for some set amount of time while this firm does the "due diligence" required for the deal. Due diligence is the corporate equivalent of a background check: the purpose is to uncover any hidden bombs that might sink the company later, like serious design flaws in the product, pending lawsuits against the company, intellectual property issues, and so on. VCs' legal and financial due diligence is pretty thorough, but the technical due diligence is generally a joke. [8]

The due diligence discloses no ticking bombs, and six weeks later they go ahead with the deal. Here are the terms: a $2 million investment at a pre-money valuation of $4 million, meaning that after the deal closes the VCs will own a third of the company (2 / (4 + 2)). The VCs also insist that prior to the deal the option pool be enlarged by an additional hundred shares. So the total number of new shares issued is 750, and the cap table becomes: <br>shareholder shares percent<br>-------------------------------<br>VCs 650 33.3<br>angel 200 10.3<br>uncle 50 2.6<br>each founder 250 12.8<br>employee 36* 1.8 *unvested<br>option pool 264 13.5<br> ---- -----<br>total 1950 100<br> This picture is unrealistic in several respects. For example, while the percentages might end up looking like this, it's unlikely that the VCs would keep the existing numbers of shares. In fact, every bit of the startup's paperwork would probably be replaced, as if the company were being founded anew. Also, the money might come in several tranches, the later ones subject to various conditions—though this is apparently more common in deals with lower-tier VCs (whose lot in life is to fund more dubious startups) than with the top firms.

And of course any VCs reading this are probably rolling on the floor laughing at how my hypothetical VCs let the angel keep his 10.3 of the company. I admit, this is the Bambi version; in simplifying the picture, I've also made everyone nicer. In the real world, VCs regard angels the way a jealous husband feels about his wife's previous boyfriends. To them the company didn't exist before they invested in it. [9]

I don't want to give the impression you have to do an angel round before going to VCs. In this example I stretched things out to show multiple sources of funding in action. Some startups could go directly from seed funding to a VC round; several of the companies we've funded have.

The founders are required to vest their shares over four years, and the board is now reconstituted to consist of two VCs, two founders, and a fifth person acceptable to both. The angel investor cheerfully surrenders his board seat.

At this point there is nothing new our startup can teach us about funding—or at least, nothing good. [10] The startup will almost certainly hire more people at this point; those millions must be put to work, after all. The company may do additional funding rounds, presumably at higher valuations. They may if they are extraordinarily fortunate do an IPO, which we should remember is also in principle a round of funding, regardless of its de facto purpose. But that, if not beyond the bounds of possibility, is beyond the scope of this article.

Deals Fall Through

Anyone who's been through a startup will find the preceding portrait to be missing something: disasters. If there's one thing all startups have in common, it's that something is always going wrong. And nowhere more than in matters of funding.

For example, our hypothetical startup never spent more than half of one round before securing the next. That's more ideal than typical. Many startups—even successful ones—come close to running out of money at some point. Terrible things happen to startups when they run out of money, because they're designed for growth, not adversity.

But the most unrealistic thing about the series of deals I've described is that they all closed. In the startup world, closing is not what deals do. What deals do is fall through. If you're starting a startup you would do well to remember that. Birds fly; fish swim; deals fall through.

Why? Partly the reason deals seem to fall through so often is that you lie to yourself. You want the deal to close, so you start to believe it will. But even correcting for this, startup deals fall through alarmingly often—far more often than, say, deals to buy real estate. The reason is that it's such a risky environment. People about to fund or acquire a startup are prone to wicked cases of buyer's remorse. They don't really grasp the risk they're taking till the deal's about to close. And then they panic. And not just inexperienced angel investors, but big companies too.

So if you're a startup founder wondering why some angel investor isn't returning your phone calls, you can at least take comfort in the thought that the same thing is happening to other deals a hundred times the size.

The example of a startup's history that I've presented is like a skeleton—accurate so far as it goes, but needing to be fleshed out to be a complete picture. To get a complete picture, just add in every possible disaster.

A frightening prospect? In a way. And yet also in a way encouraging. The very uncertainty of startups frightens away almost everyone. People overvalue stability—especially young people, who ironically need it least. And so in starting a startup, as in any really bold undertaking, merely deciding to do it gets you halfway there. On the day of the race, most of the other runners won't show up.



Notes

[1] The aim of such regulations is to protect widows and orphans from crooked investment schemes; people with a million dollars in liquid assets are assumed to be able to protect themselves. The unintended consequence is that the investments that generate the highest returns, like hedge funds, are available only to the rich.

[2] Consulting is where product companies go to die. IBM is the most famous example. So starting as a consulting company is like starting out in the grave and trying to work your way up into the world of the living.

[3] If "near you" doesn't mean the Bay Area, Boston, or Seattle, consider moving. It's not a coincidence you haven't heard of many startups from Philadelphia.

[4] Investors are often compared to sheep. And they are like sheep, but that's a rational response to their situation. Sheep act the way they do for a reason. If all the other sheep head for a certain field, it's probably good grazing. And when a wolf appears, is he going to eat a sheep in the middle of the flock, or one near the edge?

[5] This was partly confidence, and partly simple ignorance. We didn't know ourselves which VC firms were the impressive ones. We thought software was all that mattered. But that turned out to be the right direction to be naive in: it's much better to overestimate than underestimate the importance of making a good product.

[6] I've omitted one source: government grants. I don't think these are even worth thinking about for the average startup. Governments may mean well when they set up grant programs to encourage startups, but what they give with one hand they take away with the other: the process of applying is inevitably so arduous, and the restrictions on what you can do with the money so burdensome, that it would be easier to take a job to get the money.

You should be especially suspicious of grants whose purpose is some kind of social engineering-- e.g. to encourage more startups to be started in Mississippi. Free money to start a startup in a place where few succeed is hardly free.

Some government agencies run venture funding groups, which make investments rather than giving grants. For example, the CIA runs a venture fund called In-Q-Tel that is modelled on private sector funds and apparently generates good returns. They would probably be worth approaching—if you don't mind taking money from the CIA.

[7] Options have largely been replaced with restricted stock, which amounts to the same thing. Instead of earning the right to buy stock, the employee gets the stock up front, and earns the right not to have to give it back. The shares set aside for this purpose are still called the "option pool."

[8] First-rate technical people do not generally hire themselves out to do due diligence for VCs. So the most difficult part for startup founders is often responding politely to the inane questions of the "expert" they send to look you over.

[9] VCs regularly wipe out angels by issuing arbitrary amounts of new stock. They seem to have a standard piece of casuistry for this situation: that the angels are no longer working to help the company, and so don't deserve to keep their stock. This of course reflects a willful misunderstanding of what investment means; like any investor, the angel is being compensated for risks he took earlier. By a similar logic, one could argue that the VCs should be deprived of their shares when the company goes public.

[10] One new thing the company might encounter is a down round, or a funding round at valuation lower than the previous round. Down rounds are bad news; it is generally the common stock holders who take the hit. Some of the most fearsome provisions in VC deal terms have to do with down rounds—like "full ratchet anti-dilution," which is as frightening as it sounds.

Founders are tempted to ignore these clauses, because they think the company will either be a big success or a complete bust. VCs know otherwise: it's not uncommon for startups to have moments of adversity before they ultimately succeed. So it's worth negotiating anti-dilution provisions, even though you don't think you need to, and VCs will try to make you feel that you're being gratuitously troublesome.

Thanks to Sam Altman, Hutch Fishman, Steve Huffman, Jessica Livingston, Sesha Pratap, Stan Reiss, Andy Singleton, Zak Stone, and Aaron Swartz for reading drafts of this.

lunes, 7 de abril de 2008

4 ways to increase your chances for startup success

del blog Startup Spark de , espero que les sea útil.

When starting a business, there’s no guarantee of success, even when you have unique skills, experience, knowledge and talents.

successBut you can increase your chances in any given opportunity:

  1. Never stop learning. By continuing your ‘education’, you’ll build a habit that will serve as a guarantee against “being left behind or missing the boat”. Always be reading e-books, articles and news related to your efforts. Hang out in forums and blogs, ask questions, and stay tuned to what’s happening your community. I know a self-proclaimed web designer who doesn’t know a thing about creating forms, design themes for blogs, or creating an SEO-friendly website, etc. She’s just so behind the times - but thinks she can still get business.
  2. Don’t put your eggs in just one basket. You can choose one opportunity, but build a structure around that opportunity that will support the change of seasons. Market your product, service or website using several different methods to secure your long term objectives. For instance, don’t only focus on Search Engines Optimization (SEO) or Pay Per Click (PPC) Advertising. A true marketing plan uses a variety of ways to attract a targeted market. One entrpreneur I know thought just having a website would bring customers to his door. Ummm….no.
  3. Organize your time and activities. Focus on the things that are going to make you money. Too many people get caught up in the details. Instead of goofing around and fine tuning your site endlessly, do the things that will ultimately generate income. You want to be spending a good amount of time marketing your product or services. Build a system and stick to it. Don’t get caught in the trap of hanging out in some forum. It may be a way to generate some income, but you can get so rapped up you stop doing other things that will make you more money in the long run. How many of you got sucked into Facebook, and soon forgot why you got there in the first place? (I admit, I did this for a day and snapped back to reality as soon as I realized I was losing time!)
  4. When something goes wrong, embrace it! This is how we learn. Everyone goes through this learning curve. There are a lot of things that are going to happen before you are going to succeed.

viernes, 4 de abril de 2008

Historias de Emprendedores & Emprendimientos

iEco - Emprendedores

Ropa divertida para chicos

Carina Goltz (30) es psicóloga pero nunca ejerció la profesión de Freud. En cambio, creó Toddler, una marca de ropa para chicos.
La idea era crear prendas que acá no se conseguían". No era una decisión fácil. Para largarse tenía que invertir sus ahorros, además, "yo había vendido ropa pero nunca había fabricado, no tenía noción".

A pesar de todas esas contras, ella y su marido decidieron invertir diez mil pesos e intentarlo. Era 2003. "Me costó conseguir las telas y la mano de obra porque yo quería un producto distinto".

Fue averiguando paso a paso. "Primero me contacté con una modelista. Yo sabía que quería una remera con tal diseño, tal tela y tal tipo de terminación y fui averiguando quién podía hacer cada cosa. Me resultó muy difícil porque muchos talleres habían cerrado con el uno a uno. Además, la mayoría de los talleres no podía hacer los detalles de terminación que yo quería".

Recién cuando tuvo varios modelos de remeras y joggings de varón salió a recorrer locales. Eligió negocios multimarca que vendieran ropa de diseño. Belgrano y Palermo fueron los barrios que visitó.

"Cuando empecé a mostrar los primeros diseños, gustaron y me animé a hacer más modelos. Pero no podía descuidar la producción.

Empecé muy de a poco". Después, los mismos dueños de locales pidieron ropa para chicas.
Hoy tiene 35 clientes al por mayor en todo el país y ventas anuales por 600.000 pesos.

miércoles, 2 de abril de 2008

Tips para Promover Ventas en Tecnología

Del blog latamtech.biz, espero que les sea útil.

A continuación resumiré algunas ideas de como hacer las cosas previos al “momentum” de cerrar ventas en el mundo de los :

Aprovechate de tus Contactos. Pídele a tus socios de , distribuidores, proveedores, clientes y hasta a colegas que te den info interesante sobre que sepan que se están armando en el mercado en que estás. Siempre reconóceles el favor, serán tus mejores aliados si a tus nuevos clientes los tratas bien. Recuerda que los amigos de tus clientes pueden ser tus amigos… y tus clientes!

Busca Leads que puedan comprar tu producto o solución. Tus mejores prospects serán aquéllos que conozcan tu producto solución o servicio y que tengan la capacidad de pagar por él. Nunca dudes en descartar un Lead o un Prospect al enterarte que no tiene el presupuesto adecuado a corto o mediano plazo, déjalo para el próximo período, pero mantén el contacto.

Mantén Contacto con tus Leads. Los buenos vendedores dan seguimiento asiduo a sus contactos, aunque éstos no tengan viables a corto plazo. Esto nos asegura que en los futuros nos tengan en cuenta como consultores de la que representamos. Ese día convertiremos al Contacto en Lead, y al Lead en Prospect.

Investiga que Hace. Siempre hay que hacer los deberes y estudiar a tus contactos, leads y prospects, aunque sea unos minutos antes del llamado o mientras manejas tu auto hacia la reunión. Es sencillo… siempre es más factible que el prospect escuche tus propuestas si te presentas sabiendo quién es y a que se dedica.

Mantente cerca del proyecto mientras “Se Cocina”. Las oportunidades para hacer un buen negocio pueden ocurrir en todo momento y lugar, y tu deberías estar al lado de quienes piensan sus a corto, mediano o largo plazo. Lo importante es darle el seguimiento a los prospectos que hayas detectado. Nunca sabes cuándo se gatillará y pasará de ser sólo un proyecto a ser una orden de compra efectiva.

Escucha, Escucha, Escucha y No Abras La Boca. Muchas veces sentimos que a los dos minutos de haber iniciado una conversación quisieramos callar a nuestro interlocutor… a veces a ellos les pasa lo mismo con nosotros… y no podemos perder esa oportunidad de tenerlo frente a nosotros para decir las palabras justas, como por ejemplo…

Preguntas, Preguntas y más Preguntas… Durante los encuentros con tus prospects, plantéale preguntas que requieran algo más que un sí o un no como respuesta. Intenta encontrar planteamientos para los que el cliente deba hablarte de lo que tiene pensado en cuanto a costos, precios, procedimientos y aspectos técnicos del proyecto. Esto te servirá mucho para volver a preguntar…

Lo que necesita es justo lo que le ofrezco. Es deber de todo vendedor encontrar si su producto o servicio puede ofrecer los requerimientos del cliente tanto implícitos como explícitos. Tu puedes considerar que algunas cualidades de tu producto son mucho más importantes que otras, sin embargo a tus clientes puede no resultarles relevantes y mostrar interés en otros requerimientos técnicos, no dudes en reformular tu propuesta.

“Mi producto no se ajusta a los que ud necesita, muchas gracias por su tiempo”. Bajo ningún concepto des información falsa sólo para estar dentro de los requerimientos técnicos o formales del cliente. No mientas, pero recuerda que hay muchas formas de decir los mismo sin mentir.

objecionescount5.JPGEstas son algunas ideas que me surgieron ultimamente en reuniones que tuve con gente involucrada en diversos de … quería escribirlas, para que me queden para el futuro… y me di cuenta que tal vez puedan ayudar a alguno de los lectores del blog… espero sus comentarios…